Gross Intelligence Product / Methodology

One gross index of machine intelligence, built entirely from statistics that already exist

GIP invents no new measurements. It takes credible, published indexes of AI power, AI quality, AI use and AI trade, and combines them with stated rules into one gross figure for each country: what it can produce, and what it actually produces.

By Post-Labor Economics · Sunday, November 1, 2026 · Methodology version 0.2 (draft for comment)

Component family What it measures Existing source(s) Frequency Country detail
1. AI power Electricity actually consumed by AI data centres; installed AI capacity IEA Key Questions on Energy and AI; Ireland CSO; Netherlands CBS; Norway Elhub; GB DESNZ; LBNL; China NEA; Epoch AI power capacity Annual; Ireland quarterly; Norway hourly About 10 countries plus world regions
1a. Compute per unit of power Computation each unit of electricity buys Epoch AI hardware trends (FLOP/s per watt) Continuous Global
2. AI quality Capability of the models being run Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index (sole quality measure) Continuous; versioned Global (models, not countries)
3. AI consumption Who uses AI, and how much Microsoft AI Diffusion Report; Anthropic Economic Index; published token volumes Quarterly / monthly 100+ countries
4. AI exports Where AI is produced vs used Epoch AI chip-imports data (customs); WTO digitally delivered services Quarterly; annual 16 customs reporters plus inferred destinations; 200+ economies
~155 TWh World AI electricity, 2025

IEA AI-focused data centres; ~32% of 485 TWh. Modelled, not metered

72% US share of world AI chips

Epoch AI, cumulative H100e arrivals 2022 to Q2 2026

20% US share of Claude use, May 2026

Anthropic Economic Index. One provider only

~$157bn Nominal cross-check, annualized

Range ~$154bn-$163bn; ads permanently excluded

  1. 1. Two views: Capacity and Output
  2. 2. AI power
  3. 3. Country power table
  4. 4. Compute per unit of power
  5. 5. AI quality: the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index
  6. 6. AI consumption
  7. 7. AI exports
  8. 8. Combination rules
  9. 9. Illustrative figures
  10. 10. Cross-checks: dollars and tokens
  11. 11. The labor link
  12. 12. Data sources
  13. 13. Gaps
  14. 14. Sources

Headline

1. Two views per country: what it can produce, and what it does produce

A country with a giant data-centre campus but few users exports intelligence. A country full of users but few chips imports it. GIP shows both sides.

ViewPlain meaningCombination rule
GIP CapacityHow much intelligence the country could produce at full useInstalled AI capacity × compute per unit of power × AA quality
GIP Output (produced)How much it actually producedAI electricity consumed × compute per MWh × AA quality
GIP ConsumedHow much its people and firms usedWorld GIP Output × the country's share of AI use
Net AI exportsProduced minus consumedGIP Output (produced) − GIP Consumed

GIP Outputc,t = Ec,t × Ct × Qt

  • E = AI electricity actually consumed in country c (MWh), crypto mining excluded. Family 1.
  • C = compute per MWh, from Epoch AI's published hardware-efficiency trend. Family 1a.
  • Q = capability per unit of compute, from the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index. Family 2.
  • Capacity uses installed capacity (Epoch GW and H100e) in place of E.

Family 1

2. AI power: count power drawn, not capacity built

A gigawatt of announced capacity is not a gigawatt of thinking. Sites wait for chips and grid connections, and inference load rises and falls with demand. So Output uses energy actually consumed, read from meters wherever a statistics office publishes it.

  1. 1. Metered statistics first. Ireland CSO (quarterly), Norway Elhub (hourly), Netherlands CBS (annual, from grid operators), Great Britain DESNZ (annual, meter-based). Elsewhere, IEA modelled estimates, labelled as such.
  2. 2. AI share of data-centre load. Default: the IEA's AI-focused share of world data-centre electricity, 155 of 485 TWh (~32%) in 2025. Replaced by a country share whenever one is published. This is an assumption, not data.
  3. 3. Exclude crypto mining. See the exclusion rule below.
  4. 4. Capacity only in the Capacity view. Epoch AI's power capacity (about 31 GW of facility power at end-2025, partly extrapolated) and chip counts feed GIP Capacity. They enter Output only through a published utilization rate, labelled an estimate.

About a third of the world's data-centre electricity now goes to AI-focused sites

Global data-centre electricity consumption, 2025, TWh. Modelled by the IEA; excludes crypto mining

Bar chart. Use the up and down arrow keys to move through 3 categories. A data table follows.

All data centres: Electricity 485

Other = 485 − 155 (our subtraction). 'AI-focused' means sites with many accelerated servers; it includes some non-AI load inside them and misses AI run in general-purpose sites.

Data table
Other = 485 − 155 (our subtraction). 'AI-focused' means sites with many accelerated servers; it includes some non-AI load inside them and misses AI run in general-purpose sites.
site Electricity
All data centres 485
AI-focused data centres 155
Other data centres 330

Utilization

Capacity and consumption differ by roughly a factor of two. The published evidence:

EvidenceValueWhat it measuresSource
Data-centre capacity factor, world48% (2025); hyperscale 52%Average load ÷ installed capacityIEA Key Questions, Table A.1 (Apr 2026)
Data-centre load factor75%-90%Average load ÷ peak loadIEA Key Questions, ch. 8 (Apr 2026)
Norway, meteredActual use is about half the sum of each site's peakMetered load vs measured peaksElhub (Sep 2026)
AI server power when running70% of rated power; H100 training measured at 74% of TDPPower draw vs nameplateLBNL (Dec 2024)
AI server operating timeTraining 80%; inference 40%Share of the year in useLBNL (Dec 2024)
Epoch capacity basisRated chip TDP × 2.5 overhead; assumes all chips at full useCapacity, not consumptionEpoch AI (Jan 16, 2026)

International

3. Who meters data-centre power, and who only estimates it

Only a few countries read the meters. Ireland is the gold standard: a quarterly official series back to 2015. The two largest markets, the US and China, have no metered national series.

CountryLatest data-centre electricityYearShare of national electricityAI shareSourceQuality
World485 TWh2025~1.5%~155 TWh AI-focused (~32%)IEA Key Questions (Apr 2026)Modelled estimate
United States224 TWh (IEA); 176 TWh in 2023 (LBNL)2025; 20234.4% (LBNL, 2023)Not published; GPU servers >40 TWh in 2023 (LBNL, IT only)IEA Table A.4; LBNL Dec 2024Modelled estimate
China170 TWh 'computing centres' (NEA); 117 TWh (IEA)20251.6% (NEA)Not published; 42 clusters of 10,000+ AI chipsNational Energy Administration (May 29, 2026); IEAGovernment statement, method unpublished
Europe72 TWh2025-Not publishedIEA Table A.4Modelled estimate
Germany21.3 TWh (expected)2025Not givenNot publishedBorderstep Institute for BitkomIndustry-research estimate
Ireland7,663 GWh202523% of meteredNot publishedCSO (Jul 7, 2026)Official, metered, quarterly
Netherlands5,090 GWh2024 (provisional)4.6%Not publishedCBS, from grid operators (Dec 2025)Official, metered; excludes in-house sites
Great Britain4.5 TWh20242% of grid consumptionNot publishedDESNZ Energy Trends (Jun 30, 2026)Official, meter-based estimate
Norway3.14 TWh20252.26%Not published; includes crypto minersElhub (Sep 2026)Official metered; crypto not separated
Denmark4.3 PJ ≈ 1.19 TWh2025≈3.6% of final electricity (our calc.)Not publishedDanish Energy Agency, Energistatistik 2025, from the EU data-centre databaseOfficial, operator-reported (EU EED)
Singapore3.40 TWh2020~7%Not publishedMinistry reply to parliamentOfficial, stale
Japan, Sweden, FinlandNot found---Searched Nov 1, 2026Gap

Ireland's data centres use six times the power they did in 2015

Metered electricity consumption by data centres, Ireland, GWh per year. Eleven official annual points

Line chart. Use the left and right arrow keys to move through 11 periods. A data table follows.

2025: Data centres 7,663

CSO identifies data centres by operator name and high-consumption customers; they are not a separate class in the source data. No AI split.

Data table
CSO identifies data centres by operator name and high-consumption customers; they are not a separate class in the source data. No AI split.
year Data centres
2015 1,240
2016 1,482
2017 1,762
2018 2,182
2019 2,490
2020 3,030
2021 4,012
2022 5,273
2023 6,339
2024 6,973
2025 7,663
  • Official metered: Ireland (CSO), Netherlands (CBS), Norway (Elhub), Great Britain (DESNZ, meter-based). Denmark reports operator data from the EU's data-centre database, required by the Energy Efficiency Directive for sites with significant energy use.
  • Estimates only: United States, China, Germany, Europe, world. China's NEA figure (170 TWh) is 45% above the IEA's 117 TWh for the same year; definitions differ and NEA's method is not published.
  • No country publishes an AI share of data-centre electricity.

Family 1a

4. Compute per unit of power: Epoch AI's published trend, used directly

Each chip generation does more arithmetic per watt. We do not compute this ourselves. We take Epoch AI's published figures.

Published seriesValueUncertaintySource
GPU FLOP/s per watt, growth since 20081.34x a year (doubling every 2.4 years)90% CI 1.29x-1.39xEpoch AI Trends (updated Feb 5, 2026)
Leading ML hardware energy efficiency~40% a yearNot statedEpoch AI (Oct 23, 2024)
Leading AI processors, performance per watt30%-40% a yearRange as publishedIEA Key Questions, Fig. 2.2 (Apr 2026), based on Epoch AI
Stock of AI compute, growth3.4x a yearAs publishedEpoch AI Trends (Feb 5, 2026)
Facility overhead (PUE), world1.41 (2024) → 1.38 (2025)ModelledIEA Table A.1

Combination rule: C grows at Epoch's FLOP/s-per-watt rate, 1.34x a year (≈1.076x a quarter), with the 90% interval carried as the uncertainty. The IEA PUE series adjusts facility energy to chip energy.

Family 2

5. AI quality: the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index, and nothing else

GIP uses one quality yardstick so that nobody, including us, can pick the benchmarks that flatter a result. That yardstick is the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index.

  • What it is: v5.0 combines nine evaluations in four equally weighted categories: knowledge work, coding, science and general (25% each). Several of the sets are private.
  • What AA publishes for each model: the Index score, the cost in dollars to run the full Index (using providers' token counts), and the tokens used. It does not publish FLOP.
  • So capability per unit of compute is measured as Index score per dollar of cost to run the Index, deflated by Epoch AI's chip price-performance trend (1.49x a year) so that hardware gains already counted in C are not counted twice.
  • Two series, reported separately: frontier (best score at the start of each quarter) and median (the model at the median of usage). Most electricity serves non-frontier models, so the median series feeds the headline.

Qt / Qt−1 = (AA score ÷ cost to run)t(AA score ÷ cost to run)t−1 ÷ Epoch FLOP-per-dollar growth

Family 3

6. AI consumption: who actually uses it

Two large, published country datasets now exist. Microsoft counts the share of working-age people who used generative AI. Anthropic publishes each country's share of Claude use.

Country Working-age AI users, Q2 2026 (Microsoft) Share of Claude use, May 2026 (Anthropic) Claude use per capita index (1.0 = population share)
United States33.0%20.16%3.87
India18.5%7.12%0.30
United Kingdom43.7%3.47%3.35
Japan24.7%3.28%1.91
Germany32.3%2.98%2.40
Netherlands43.5%1.07%3.90
Singapore64.3%0.62%5.81
Norway49.4%0.35%4.04
Denmark32.4%0.32%3.57
Ireland49.9%0.27%3.23
China17.5%Not publishedNot published
World18.8%100%1.0
  • Combination rule: a country's consumption share is the average of its share of world AI users (Microsoft rate × working-age population) and its share of Claude use (Anthropic). Two independent sources limit one firm's market-share bias.
  • Token volumes (Google, OpenRouter) are global, not by country; they check the total, not the split.
  • Microsoft's measure comes from device telemetry adjusted for operating-system share, internet penetration and population. Anthropic's covers Claude only; no China row is published.

Family 4

7. AI exports: where intelligence is made vs where it is used

Nearly every AI chip crosses a border. Epoch AI reads customs records to estimate where chips end up. Set against who uses AI, this shows who exports intelligence.

The US holds 72% of the world's AI chips, but accounts for 20% of Claude use

Share of cumulative AI-chip compute arrivals (H100e), 2022 to Q2 2026, and share of Claude use, May 2026, %

Illustrative

Bar chart. Use the up and down arrow keys to move through 9 categories. A data table follows.

United States: AI chips: Share 72.2%

Shares of 27.4m H100e (our sum of Epoch's country rows). Arrivals are not deployed compute. Claude use is one provider; no China figure. Illustrative indicator of direction, not a GIP figure.

Data table
Shares of 27.4m H100e (our sum of Epoch's country rows). Arrivals are not deployed compute. Claude use is one provider; no China figure. Illustrative indicator of direction, not a GIP figure. Illustrative.
series Share
United States: AI chips 72.2%
United States: Claude use 20.2%
China: AI chips 9.6%
India: AI chips 1.6%
India: Claude use 7.1%
United Kingdom: AI chips 1.2%
United Kingdom: Claude use 3.5%
Japan: AI chips 1.6%
Japan: Claude use 3.3%
Existing sourceWhat it givesUse in GIPLimit
Epoch AI chip importsQuarterly AI-chip arrivals by destination (trade value, units, H100e), net of re-exports, since 2022Capacity by country; production locationEU reported as one bloc; arrivals precede deployment
WTO digitally delivered servicesExports and imports of services delivered over networks, 200+ economies, 2005-2025Context for cross-border AI servicesNo AI or cloud-only split
Cloud region dataWhich provider regions serve which usersWould map production to consumptionNo public dataset found

Combination rule: Net AI exports = GIP Output produced in the country (power-located) − GIP Consumed (use-located). Production is allocated by AI electricity where metered or estimated, otherwise by Epoch chip share.

Combination rules

8. How the indexes are combined

These are the only choices GIP makes. Everything else is someone else's number.

  1. Normalization. Each family is converted to quarter-on-quarter growth and to country shares of the world total. Units cancel; only ratios are combined.
  2. Weighting. No subjective weights. Power, compute per MWh and quality multiply, because each converts one stage into the next. Consumption shares are a simple average of two sources. Exports are a subtraction.
  3. Quarterly chain-linking. Indext = Indext−1 × (Et/Et−1) × (Ct/Ct−1) × (Qt/Qt−1). Inputs and the AA version in use are frozen within each quarter and refreshed at quarter end.
  4. Version splices. A new AA Index version or a new source series enters through a one-quarter overlap, read on both old and new; the ratio in that quarter splices them.
  5. Annual-only data. World and US electricity are annual. Until quarterly figures exist, quarterly links carry them as a stated assumption, flagged in each release. No chart point is ever interpolated.
  6. Revisions. Releases about 45 days after quarter end; the prior four quarters are revised when meter data or filings arrive; every change is logged.

Back of the envelope

9. Illustrative figures

Two of the three output terms can be filled from published numbers today. Together they say the world's AI fleet delivered about twice as much computation in 2025 as in 2024. The quality term waits for an Artificial Analysis series.

AI power and chip efficiency alone doubled delivered computation in 2025

Illustrative growth factors, 2025 vs 2024 (times)

Illustrative

Bar chart. Use the up and down arrow keys to move through 4 categories. A data table follows.

E: AI electricity (IEA): Growth factor 1.5x

1.5 × 1.34 ≈ 2.0 (range 1.5 × 1.29 ≈ 1.9 to 1.5 × 1.39 ≈ 2.1). The IEA's +50% has no published range. Quality not yet included.

Data table
1.5 × 1.34 ≈ 2.0 (range 1.5 × 1.29 ≈ 1.9 to 1.5 × 1.39 ≈ 2.1). The IEA's +50% has no published range. Quality not yet included. Illustrative.
component Growth factor
E: AI electricity (IEA) 1.5x
C: compute per MWh (Epoch FLOP/s per watt) 1.34x
E x C: delivered computation 2.01x
Q: AA quality per compute –
FigureValueHow derivedStatus
World AI electricity, 2025~155 TWhIEA AI-focused data-centre electricity, as cited by OWIDModelled estimate
US AI electricity, 2025~72 TWhIEA US 224 TWh × world AI-focused share 155/485 (our assumption)Illustrative; likely understated
Delivered computation, 2025 vs 2024~2.0x (1.9x-2.1x)E × CIllustrative
US share of world AI chips (Capacity proxy)72.2%Epoch cumulative H100e arrivals to Q2 2026Third-party estimate
Real GIP growth including qualityWithheldNeeds the AA score-per-cost series and its first frozen quarterNot defensible yet
Real GIP index, 2023 = 100WithheldNo IEA AI-focused figure for 2023 is publishedNot defensible yet
Country Output, Consumed, Net exportsWithheldNeeds working-age population weights and country AI-electricity sharesNot computed yet

Cross-checks

10. Dollars and tokens, kept beside the headline

If GIP rises fast while revenue and tokens stall, something in the combination is wrong. These series are the alarm bells.

Four firms sell AI output at about $157bn a year; Google's share is not disclosed

Annualized AI-service revenue, $bn, latest disclosure. Ads permanently excluded. Partial coverage

Bar chart. Use the up and down arrow keys to move through 6 categories. A data table follows.

Anthropic (Q3 2026 x 4): Revenue $67.2

Anthropic = Q3 2026 revenue $16.8bn × 4; SpaceX = Q2 2026 AI solutions ex-cloud ~$594m × 4 (our calculations). Range ~$154bn-$163bn.

Data table
Anthropic = Q3 2026 revenue $16.8bn × 4; SpaceX = Q2 2026 AI solutions ex-cloud ~$594m × 4 (our calculations). Range ~$154bn-$163bn.
firm Revenue
Anthropic (Q3 2026 x 4) $67.2
OpenAI (end Sep 2026 run-rate) $50
Microsoft AI business (Mar 2026) $37
SpaceX SI ex-cloud (Q2 2026 x 4) $2.4
Google (in scope not disclosed) $0
Nominal cross-check $156.6
Cross-checkLatestRuleSource
Nominal GIP~$157bn annualized (range ~$154bn-$163bn)Sales of intelligence only. All advertising permanently excluded and never imputed. Rented compute excluded as intermediate. Count each dollar once.Company disclosures and SEC filings
Google tokens, all surfaces>3.2 quadrillion a month (May 2026)Company-reported; no country splitGoogle I/O 2026
Google first-party API tokens~32bn a minute (Q3 2026)Company-reportedAlphabet Q3 2026 call
OpenRouter public-ranking tokens188T, week of Oct 19, 2026Third-party compilationThe Latent

Work

11. The labor link

The question for this blog is what machine output means for human work. So GIP is shown per human hour worked, in the US and wherever hours data exist.

GIP per hourc,t = GIP Outputc,tTotal hours workedc,t

  • US: BLS nonfarm business hours worked (series PRS85006033), index 105.9 in Q2 2026 (2017 = 100). Labor's share of output was 52.8% in Q2 2026, the lowest on record since 1947 (BLS, Sep 15, 2026).
  • Other countries: OECD average annual hours actually worked per worker. Total hours = hours per worker × employment; the employment step is not yet built.
  • Reading: if GIP per hour climbs while labor share falls, machine output is substituting for paid work rather than complementing it.
CountryHours per worker, 20252024
United States1,8001,796
Ireland1,6391,645
Japan1,5981,617
United Kingdom1,5331,538
Finland1,4921,502
Netherlands1,4361,452
Sweden1,4211,433
Norway1,3861,388
Denmark1,3691,372
Germany1,3321,334

Source: OECD, Average annual hours actually worked per worker (dataset updated Jun 7, 2026), retrieved Nov 1, 2026. OECD says the series suits comparisons over time, not of levels between countries.

Inputs

12. Data sources

What exists today for each family, checked Nov 1, 2026.

FamilySeriesPublisherFrequencyLatest value (date)Quality
PowerData-centre electricity, world and regions; capacity factor; PUEIEAAnnual485 TWh 2025; US 224; China 117; Europe 72 (Apr 2026)Modelled (intergovernmental)
PowerAI-focused data-centre electricityIEA, cited by Our World in DataAnnual155 TWh 2025 (Sep 2026)Modelled, secondary citation
PowerUS data-centre electricity; AI server assumptionsLBNLAd hoc176 TWh 2023, 4.4% (Dec 2024)Official (DOE lab), modelled
PowerIreland data centres, meteredCSOQuarterly7,663 GWh 2025, 23% (Jul 7, 2026)Official, metered
PowerNetherlands data centresCBSAnnual5.09bn kWh 2024, 4.6% (Dec 2025)Official, metered
PowerNorway data centresElhubHourly3.14 TWh 2025, 2.26% (Sep 2026)Official, metered; crypto mixed in
PowerGreat Britain data centresDESNZAd hoc4.5 TWh 2024, 2% (Jun 30, 2026)Official, meter-based
PowerDenmark data centresDanish Energy AgencyAnnual4.3 PJ 2025Official, operator-reported
PowerChina computing centresNational Energy AdministrationAd hoc170bn kWh 2025, 1.6% (May 29, 2026)Government statement
PowerGermany data centresBorderstep Institute / BitkomAnnual21.3bn kWh expected 2025Industry estimate
PowerSingapore data centresMinistry of Digital Development and InformationAd hoc3.40 TWh 2020, ~7%Official, stale
Power (exclusion)US crypto mining electricityEIADiscontinued survey0.6%-2.3% of US electricity, 2023 (Feb 1, 2024)Official, preliminary
Power (capacity)AI data-centre power capacityEpoch AIQuarterly31.24 GW facility power, end-2025, partly extrapolated (Jan 16, 2026)Third-party estimate
Compute per powerFLOP/s per watt; compute stock growthEpoch AI TrendsContinuous1.34x a year; stock 3.4x a year (Feb 5, 2026)Third-party estimate
QualityAA Intelligence Index v5.0Artificial AnalysisContinuousNine evaluations; v5 launched Oct 27, 2026Third-party index (sole quality measure)
ConsumptionAI diffusion by countryMicrosoft AI Economy InstituteQuarterlyWorld 18.8% of working-age people, Jun 2026 (Sep 2026)Company telemetry, adjusted
ConsumptionClaude usage share and per-capita index by countryAnthropic Economic IndexMonthlyUS 20.16% of use, May 2026 (release Jun 26, 2026)Company data, one provider
ExportsAI chip imports by destinationEpoch AIQuarterly27.4m H100e cumulative to Q2 2026; US 72.2% (CSV Oct 27, 2026)Third-party, from customs data
ExportsDigitally delivered services tradeWTOAnnual2005-2025, 200+ economies (Jul 2026)Official estimate, not AI-specific
LaborHours worked, nonfarm businessBLS (PRS85006033)Quarterly105.9, 2017 = 100 (Q2 2026)Official
LaborHours per worker by countryOECDAnnual2025 values (Jun 7, 2026)Official

Transparency

13. Gaps

  1. Quality series not built: we have not yet pulled Artificial Analysis's history of Index scores and cost to run, so the quality term and real GIP growth are withheld.
  2. No country publishes the AI share of data-centre electricity. The IEA's world share (~32%) is applied everywhere, which likely understates the US.
  3. No metered national series for the US or China. EIA has no data-centre series; its crypto survey was discontinued.
  4. World and US electricity are annual; GIP is quarterly. Quarterly links carry annual data as a flagged assumption.
  5. Consumption: Anthropic covers one provider and publishes no China row; Microsoft measures users, not intensity. No OECD or Stanford AI Index country adoption series was retrieved for this draft.
  6. Exports: no public data map cloud regions to users; WTO digital-services trade has no AI split; Epoch reports the EU as one bloc.
  7. Utilization: no Uptime Institute, ERCOT, PJM or Dominion figure on consumed vs contracted AI load was verified. Interconnection queues measure requests, not use.
  8. Crypto is not separated in Norway's metered series or, as far as published, in Ireland's or the Netherlands'.
  9. Japan, Sweden, Finland: no national data-centre electricity figure found. Singapore's latest official figure is from 2020. China's NEA and IEA figures disagree by 45%.
  10. The IEA AI-focused figure (155 TWh) is taken from Our World in Data's citation of the IEA datafile; we have not opened the datafile itself.

Sources

14. Sources

Post-Labor Economics · grossintelligenceproduct.com · Methodology v0.2 · Last updated Nov 1, 2026. Prior work: Lee Seung-hyun (42Maru) proposed Gross Intelligence Product as a measure of AI output; this is an independent, data-driven methodology.